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Wolff on the immortality of the soul
Quod si in hoc erro, qui animos hominum
inmortalis esse credam, libenter erro; nec
mihi hunc errorem, quo delector, dum
vivo, extorqueri volo.
(And if I err in my belief that the souls of
men are immortal, I gladly err, nor do I
wish this error which gives me pleasure to
be wrested from me while I live.)
Cicero, De senectute, § 85.
I. The soul between empirical and rational psychology
The immortality of the soul can be legitimately considered the peak of Wolff!s
psychological investigation. Indeed, this topic concludes the rational science of
the soul, both in the early version that Wolff presents in the 5th chapter of the
so-calledGermanMetaphysics (1719), and in its mature andmore developed for-
mulation in the Latin Psychologia rationalis (1734).1 It means that during the
15 years gap between the two works, Wolff maintains the belief that the proof
of immortality gathers in itself the knowledge provided by the rational science
of the soul. Actually, this belief rests on a twofold ground "subjective! and "objec-
tive! – deeply rooted into the fundamental structure of Wolff!s philosophy. The
"subjective! ground concerns the way understanding has to take in order to
reach the complexity of truth. As Wolff constantly repeats in the prefaces to
the new editions of these works and in other writings, clearness and distinctness
can only be gathered gradually: “like the regulated nutrition promotes the gradual
increase of the body, the understanding is gradually led by a moderate exercise to
1 Christian Wolff, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen
(1719), reprint ed. 1751 Hildesheim 1983 (from now on: DeutscheMetaphysik); ders. , Psychologia
rationalis, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima humana indubia experientiae fide
innotescunt, per essentiam et naturam animae explicantur, et ad intimiorem naturae ejusque auctoris
cognitionem pro futura proponentur (1734), reprint ed. 1740 Hildesheim 1994.
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its own development.”2 The understanding needs to be slowly trained in order to
build its solid system of truths, going from the more simple to the more complex
ones. InWolff!s philosophy this "subjective! reason rests on an "objective!ground,
i. e. on the metaphysical nexus rerum which represents at a time the logical con-
nection of truths. Indeed as he points out in his Ontologia: “Veritas adeo, quae
transcendentalis appellatur & rebus ipsis inesse intelligitur, est ordo in varietate
eorum, quae simul sunt ac se invicem consequuntur, aut, si mavis, ordo eorum,
quae enti convenient.”3 “Universal truths are connected”, since the nexus between
them has its ground in the same nexus that connects things, as he illustrated in his
Cosmologia, so that the metaphysical or transcendental truth (veritas transcen-
dentalis) is at the very ground of the logical truth of the sciences (veritas logica).4
In the impressivemethodological introduction to the series of his Latinworks, the
Discursus praeliminaris de philosophia in genere, Wolff insists on this aspect by
defining the cognitio scientifica seu philosophica as the kind of knowledge that
takes into account the fundamental connection of truths.5
The choice to locate the question of immortality at the end of the investigation
of rational psychology goes back to the idea that the notion of immortality gathers
in a systematic order the components of the entire knowledge concerning the es-
sence and the nature of the soul already developed in the previous parts of the in-
quiry. That!s the reasonwhy the rational demonstrationof immortality– i. e. of the
capacity the soul has to survive after the death of the body – has its starting point in
the investigation of the essence of the soul. But this kind of investigation which
belongs properly to the scopes of rational psychology rests on empirical i. e. a po-
steriori remarkson the existenceof the soul thatWolff derives from theundeniable
experience of every thinking subject.As he stated in theProlegomena to empirical
psychology, the investigation of the soul begins with a kind of introspection, i. e.
with the observation and description ofwhat occurs in the soul. In thePsychologia
empirica, Wolff claims the existence of the soul by means of a revised version of
Descartes! argument of the cogito.6 Indeed he affirms that as soon as we “pay at-
2 Wolff, DeutscheMetaphysik (see fn. 1), Preface to the 4th edition (1729), § 12; but see also the
5th chapter of Christian Wolff, Ausführliche Nachricht von seinen eigenen Schrifften, die er in
deutscher Sprache heraus gegeben (21733, 1726), reprint Hildesheim 1996.
3 ChristianWolff, Philosophia prima, siveOntologia, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua omnis
cognitionis humanae principia continentur (1729), reprint. ed. 1736 Hildesheim 1962, § 495.
4 Ibid., § 482 and § 482 nota.
5 Cristian Wolff, Discursus praeliminaris de Philosophia in genere / Einleitende Abhandlung
über Philosophie im allgemeinen (1728), transl. and ed. by Günter Gawlik, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt
1996, § 6.
6 On the relation between Ren% Descartes! cogito and Wolff!s so-called "cogitamus-argument!
cf. Thierry Arnaud, Le crit&re dum%taphysique chezWolff. Pourquoi une Psychologie empirique au
sein de la m%taphysique, in: Archives de philosophie LXV (2001), 35–46, here 44; Thierry Arnaud,
O' commence la “M%taphysique allemande” de ChristianWolff?, in: Olivier-Pierre Rudolph, Jean-
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tention to our perceptions”, “we experience in every moment that we are cons-
cious (consci) of ourselves, and of other external things”.7 The certainty of our
existence is highly evident, and doesn!t require any further demonstration. The
same statement can be found in the opening paragraph of the German Metaphy-
sics, where Wolff affirms:
we are conscious (bewust) of ourselves and of other things. No onewho is not complet-
ely out of his mind can doubt that, and should someone want to deny it by pretending,
through his words, that things are other than he finds within himself, that person could
quickly be shown that his pretense is absurd. For how could he deny something or call
something into doubt if hewere not conscious of himself and other things?Butwhoever
is conscious of what he denies or calls into doubt, exists. And consequently it is clear
that we exist.8
The thing in us that is conscious of itself and of other things is the soul (anima,
mens), which therefore exists.9 The soul is here defined as a thing (ens), which
shows the double level of perception (the act of representing something) and ap-
perception (the awareness of our perceptions).10 Leibniz had acknowledged to it.
Thanks to this direct access to our perceptions, "introspection! represents a privi-
leged form of experiencewhich leads us to the immediate knowledge of the exist-
ence of the soul, which, for Wolff, foregrounds the knowledge we have of the
existence of bodies, in complete accordance with the Cartesian doubt.11 The
capacity for thinking is nothing but the capacity of the soul to be conscious of
what occurs in it, so that “thought (cogitatio) is an act of the soul, by means of
which it is conscious of itself and of other external things”. Therefore, every tho-
ught requires both perception and apperception.12
The statement about the existence of a thinking being concerns therefore the
realm of empirical psychology, i. e. of the science that – as Wolff stresses – pro-
vides to rational psychology both the certain empirical ground, and the final con-
firmation of its a priori deductions.13 The empirical "facts! of the soul, namely the
FranÅois Goubet (eds.), Die Psychologie Christian Wolffs. Systematische und historische Untersu-
chungen, Tübingen 2001, 61–73; Pietro Kobau, Essere qualcosa. Ontologia e psicologia in Wolff,
Torino 2004, 37–46.
7 ChristianWolff, Psychologia empirica, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ea, quae de anima
humana indubia experientiae fide constant, continentur et ad solidam universae philosophiae prac-
ticae ac theologiae naturalis tractationem via sternitur (1732), reprint. ed. 1738 Hildesheim 1968,
§ 11.
8 Wolff, Deutsche Metaphysik (see fn. 1), § 1.
9 Cf. ibid., §§ 20 et sq.
10 Cf. ibid., §§ 24 et sq.
11 Cf. ibid., § 22.
12 Ibid., §§ 23–26.
13 In his Psychologia empiricaWolff defines this proceeding as follows: “Empirical psychology
is the science that establishes principles through experience, whence reason is given for what occurs
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narrative descriptions of its working and the deduction of the principles thiswork-
ing rests on, allow to derive from the undeniable experience of "being conscious!
of itself and of other external things, i. e. of "thinking!, the presence of a being
which needs to be able to think. The task of rational psychology, then, is to
find out which properties that being has to be endowed with in order to be in
the condition to perform thinking.
II. Unity and simplicity of the thinking being
By sketching the essential properties of the soul, Wolff shows once more his clo-
seness to Leibniz, who introduced the unity of the substance as a necessary con-
dition for any perceptual activity. According to the Monadologia (§ 13) – a text
Wolff knew pretty well – to perceive, i. e. to represent something means to gather
the plurality of the represented object in the unity of the representing substance.
This "synthetic! processwas labeledwith the notorious formula of the reductio ad
unum, and identified the unity of the subject-substancewith the fundamental con-
dition of representation.Being the unification of themultiplicity in the unitary and
identical substance the very first condition of any perception and apperception,
Leibniz claims that every substance has a dynamic and active nature, in contrast
to the old Cartesian image of substance as a static being. Even if Descartes pre-
sents the res cogitans as a substance whose essence consists in thinking, he never
points out that thinking requires a unitary and identical substrate, or rather that
those properties of substance should be the "necessary conditions! of any thinking
activity. Indeed, he doesn!t derive the unity and identity of the res cogitans from its
capacity to think – as the unavoidable conditions of such an activity. Instead he
introduces them on the basis of a confrontation – via negativa – between the
res cogitans and the res extensa: bodies being extended, composed and material,
souls must be not extended, not composed and not material.14
Wolff explains the capacity to perform the reductio ad unum as the capacity of
the soul to compare its representations, and each of their parts within its unitary
being. A composite being wouldn!t be able to produce the same kind of represen-
in the human soul” (§ 1). And, beside that, “Empirical psychology serves to examine and confirm
discoveries made a priori concerning the human soul” (§ 5). On the relation between empirical
psychology and experimental physics, cf. Jean Ecole, Des rapports de l!exp%rience et de la raison
dans l!analyse de l!(me ou la Psychologie empirica de ChristianWolff, in: Giornale di metafisica 21
(1966), 589–617, and Jean Ecole, De la notion de philosophie exp%rimentale chez Wolff, in: Les
Etudes philosophiques 4 (1979), 397–406; Anna Maria Vittadello, Experience et raison dans la
psychologie de Christian Wolff, in: Revue philosophique de Louvain 11 (1973), 488–511.
14 Ren%Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, in: Œuvres comple`tes, ed. by Paul Adam
and Charles Tannery, Paris 1897–1909, vol. 7 (1904), 85 et sq.
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tations of a unitary substance, since its composite nature would threaten the uni-
tary nature of thought and split its components across themanifold.Wolff explains
this difference stating that the representations of the soul are repraesentationes in
simplici andnot repraesentationes in compositi like the ones that occur in physical
substances, e. g. in a painting or in a mirror.15
According toWolff, the unity of the soul represents the first of its properties as
pointed out by rational investigation: the soul is a simple substance.16 Simplicity is
connected to a further property, that is, to immateriality, since every material sub-
stance is ipso facto extended and therefore divisible into parts. Beside conceiving
it as simple and immaterial, Wolff characterizes the soul also as an ens spirituale,
i. e. as a substance endowed with understanding and will, both conceived as ma-
nifestations of the unique vis repraesentativa that Wolff understands as the es-
sence of the soul.17 Being an ens spirituale the soul differs both from the extended
body and from its components, to whom Wolff, unlike Leibniz, doesn!t ascribe
any perceptual activity.18 By means of the famous thought experiment of the
giant mill, Leibniz!sMonadologia (§ 17) had already shown in a very persuasive
way the impossibility to explain the generation of thought on the basis of the me-
chanical interaction of the material components of an extended body.19 Agreeing
15 Cf. Wolff, Psychologia rationalis (see fn. 1), § 83. Cf. Deutsche Metaphysik (see fn. 1), § 217,
§§ 740 et sq., § 751. On this topic cf. Paola Rumore, Die Bilder der Seele. Vorstellung und Einheit,
in: Luigi Cataldi Madonna (ed.), Macht und Bescheidenheit der Vernunft. Beiträge zur Philosophie
Christian Wolffs, Hildesheim 2005, 111–122.
16 Wolff, Deutsche Metaphysik (see fn. 2), § 742; Psychologia rationalis (see fn. 1), § 48.
17 Ibid., § 645, § 66.
18 Ibid., § 644 nota: “Falluntur autem, qui sibi aliisque persuadere conantur, quasi iuxta Leib-
nitium materia ex spiritibus tanquam totum ex partibus componatur, et multo magis falluntur, qui
nobis hanc sententiam tribuunt, cum elementis rerum materialium, nonnisi semplicitatem vindic-
emus, qualis vero sit vis ipsis insita in dubio relinquamus” (whereas those who try to convince
themselves and other people that, as Leibniz states, matter is composed of spirits as a whole is
composed of its parts, are mistaken and those who ascribe to us that judgment since I don!t claim
anything else than simplicity for the elements of material things, and I am in doubt as to the nature of
the power they are endowed with, are even more mistaken). In order to stress this distance from
Leibniz!s monadology, Wolff calls these simple immaterial elements, which are not endowed with
perceptions, “atomi naturae” (atoms of nature) or “elementa rerum materialium” (elements of
material things), cf. Christian Wolff, Cosmologia generalis, methodo scientifica pertractata, qua ad
solidam, inprimis Dei atque naturae, cognitionem via sternitur (1731), reprint ed. 1737 Hildesheim
1964, § 187. Cf. Hans-Jürgen Engfer, Von der Leibnizschen Monadologie zur empirischen Psy-
chologie Wolffs, in: Sonia Carboncini, Luigi Cataldi Madonna (eds.), Nuovi studi sul pensiero di
Christian Wolff, in: Il cannocchiale 2–3 (1989), 193–215 (reprint Hildesheim 1992).
19 On this topic cf. Margaret Wilson, Leibniz and Materialism, in: Margaret Wilson (ed.), Ideas
and Mechanism, Princeton 1999, 388–406; Stewart Duncan, Leibniz!s Mill Arguments against
Materialism, in: Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2012), 250–272; Marleen Rosemond, Mills Can!t
Think: Leibniz!s Approach to the Mind-Body Problem, in: Res Philosophica 91 (2014), 1–28; Paul
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with Leibniz!s argument, Wolff rejects any mechanical explanation of the origin
of thought and claims therefore that the simple substance of the soul must also be
immaterial.20
III. Immateriality and incorruptibility
The tight connection between simplicity and immateriality is at the roots of the
long-lasting belief that simplicity has played a central and often overestimated
role in the long series of demonstrations of immortality provided by the history
of western philosophy. The deduction of the immortality of the soul from its sim-
plicity –whatKantwould stigmatize in his firstCritique as the “Achilles” of every
rational psychology21 – is actually based on the alleged equivalence between im-
mortality and incorruptibility. Being simple and not composed, the soul cannot be
divided into parts, and is therefore incorruptible; simple beings are ipso facto in-
corruptible, thus immortal.
This so-called "simplicity argument! has a long tradition which goes back to
Plato!s distinction between the visible and the intelligible world, being the first
the realm of physical objects which are constantly changing, transient, and ephe-
meral, and the latter the realm of immaterial, unchanging, and eternal Forms. The
soul – according to what Socrates claims in the Phaedo (78b4–84b8) – is imma-
terial because it must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends. It is therefore
unchanging and eternal too22. Plato!s strong argument for immortality rests on the
belief that the soul itself is governed by the principle that a thing cannot participate
at a time in a Form and in its opposite (102d–103a), and can be summarized as
follows. Being the soul something that always brings life in itself (105c–d), it
will never participate in the opposite of life, that is, death without ceasing to
be a soul (105d–e). Therefore, the soul cannot die (105e–106d), and is indestruc-
tible (106e–107a). Plato!s final argument for immortality doesn!t actually rest on
the idea of simplicity; in fact, Plato lacked a conception of substance as the later
Aristotelian hypokeimenon, that is a persisting substrate of essential or changing
attributes, among which one could eventually include the attribute of simplicity.
Lodge, Leibniz!s Mill Argument against Mechanical Materialism revisited, in: Ergo 1 (2014),
79–99.
20 Wolff, Deutsche Metaphysik (see fn. 1), § 742; Psychologia rationalis (see fn. 1), § 47.
21 Immanuel Kant, KrVA 351. On Kant!s idea of the “Achille” cf. Corey W. Dyck, Kant and
Rational Psychology, Oxford 2014; William Harper, Kant on the Achilles Argument, in: Thomas
M. Lennon, Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology, Dordrecht 2008,
235–246.
22 The idea that the simplicity argument goes back to Plato is stressed by Ben Lazar Mijuskovic,
The Achilles of Rationalist Arguments. The Simplicity, Unity, and Identity of Thought and Soul
from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant, The Hague 1974.
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Recent publications have shown in a very clear way that it is just within the Ne-
oplatonic tradition, especially with Plotinus, that the "simplicity argument! beco-
mes the starting point of any pre-modern and modern rational proof of immorta-
lity.23
Still Descartes recalls this argument to stress the fact that for what concerns the
topic of immortality, metaphysics misses the goal: indeed, in the summary of his
Mediatationes de philosophia prima – originally conceived asMediatationes de
philosophia prima, in qua Dei essentia et animae immortalitas demonstratur –
Descarts admits that a metaphysical investigation can only lead to the demonstra-
tion of the real difference between soul and body.24 He goes from the “clearest
possible conception of the soul”, which is “entirely distinct from all the concep-
tions which we may have of body” (II. Med.), to the fact that “we may be assured
that all the thingswhichwe conceive clearly and distinctly are true in theveryway
in which we think them” (IV. Med.). Then, he concludes from the “distinct con-
ception of corporeal nature” (II. , V., VI. Med.) “that those things which we con-
ceive clearly and distinctly as being diverse substances, as we regard mind and
body to be, are really substances essentially distinct one from the other”
(VI. Med.). From this essential, i. e. real, distinction Descartes derives that “not
only are their natures different but even in some respects contrary to one another”
(VI. Med.), so that if the body is conceived as divisible, the soulmust be conceived
as indivisible. Even though the real differenceof the two substances is sufficient to
“show clearly enough that the extinction of themind does not follow from the cor-
ruption of the body, and also to givemen the hope of another life after death”,25 the
premises for the proof of immortality have to be found in the realm of Physics.
Only in that realm one can try to establish in the first place that both the res cogi-
tans, and the res extensa qua talis are in their nature incorruptible, and “that they
can never cease to exist unless God, in denying to them his concurrence, reduce
them to nough”; and that, in the second place, the human body (differently from
the soul) is composed of a certain configuration of parts and of other similar ac-
cidents, so that it becomes a different thing from the sole fact that the figure or
form of any of its portions is found to be changed. “From this it follows that
the human body may indeed easily enough perish, but the mind [or soul of
man (I make no distinction between them)] is owing to its nature immortal.”26
23 Cf. Karen Margrethe Nielsen, Did Plato Articulate the Achilles Argument?, in: Thomas
M. Lennon, Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Achilles of Rationalist Psychology (see fn. 21), 19–41;
and in the same volume the paper by Devin Henry, The Neoplatonic Achilles, 59–74.
24 Following quotations are from Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia (see fn. 14),
Synopsis sex sequentium meditationum, 12–16.
25 Ibid., 13.
26 Ibid.
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By means of these considerations, Descartes introduces a very fruitful idea in
the history of the proofs of immortality, that is the idea that substances are natu-
raliter incorruptible,whereas their annihilation canonlyhappen supernaturaliter,
i. e. by means of God!s intervention.
Wolff agrees with Descartes in conceiving the soul as naturally incorruptible;
but he also agrees with Leibniz in identifying the nature of the soul in its essential
vis repraesentativa, so that what is natural for the soul must have in that vis its
sufficient reason.27 According to Leibniz monads cannot be created nor destruc-
ted, since their simple nature doesn!t admit either a creation per aggregationem or
a destruction perdisgregationem.Nevertheless,monads are finite substances, that
is, theydon!t have thegroundof their existence in themselves but dependonGod!s
decision. In Leibniz!s incisive image in the Monadologia (§ 47): “[Monads] are
generated, so to speak, by continual fulgurations of the Divinity”, and destroyed
by an act of annihilation, passing respectively from the realm on non-being to the
realm of being and vice versa instantaneously, and not throughout a gradual pro-
cess.
Wolff adopts Leibniz!s conception, according towhich the soul, being a simple
and spiritual substance, cannot perish in the same way bodies do: the soul is nat-
urally incorruptible since corruptibilitywould contradict its nature.28 Itmeans that
it can only be annihilated bymeans of a divine act of instantaneous annihilation.29
Being essentially and naturally incorruptible, Wolff!s soul doesn!t perish with
the body.30 But as such this feature doesn!t imply that the soul is in itself immortal,
since unlike Plato and Descartes, Wolff doesn!t think that the two notions of in-
corruptibility and immortality are completely overlapping. Wolff denounces this
fallaciousbelief already in the first editionof hisGermanmetaphysicsby stressing
that the property of incorruptibility belongs both to matter, that is to the simple
elements of bodies, and to souls: “Matter is incorruptible, but not immortal. If
the body ceases to exist because of the separation of its material parts, which is
the death of animals and human beings, it doesn!t imply that matter itself is de-
stroyed, but it still remains in the world as before, and is therefore incorruptible.
But no one would affirm that matter is therefore immortal”.31 In the later Anno-
tations to German metaphysics (1724) Wolff uses this argument to carry on his
polemics against the Cartesians who deny souls to beasts: “Cartesians are usually
well-satisfiedwhen they demonstrate that the soul is incorruptible and doesn!t pe-
27 Wolff, Deutsche Metaphysik (see fn. 1), § 75; Psychologia rationalis (see fn. 1), §§ 68 et sq.
28 Ibid., §§ 666–669.
29 Ibid., §§ 670 et sq., 732.
30 Ibid., §§ 729–731.
31 Wolff, Deutsche Metaphysik (see fn. 1), § 927.
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rish with the body. But this is still insufficient; indeed in this way the human soul
wouldn!t be anything special in comparison to the souls of the beasts”.32
But Wolff!s denunciation comes out in the clearest way in his epistula gratu-
latoria (1721) for Ludwig Philipp Thümmig!s Demonstratio immortalitatis ani-
mae ex intima eius natura deducta, where he claims that the origin of this falla-
cious belief goes back to the times of Plato and Socrates.33 According to Wolff,
Plato andDescartes overlooked that, besidemetaphysical incorruptibility, the im-
mortality of the soul requires a further essential feature: after the deathof the body,
the soul has to persist in a condition of self-consciousness.34 This establishes what
Wolff calls the “individualitas moralis” of the soul as a person, that is, “a being
which preserves self-consciousness, namely which can remember to be the
same being that previously was in this or in that state, and which is also called
individuum morale”.35 Being conscious of its own perceptions and preserving
the memory of its own previous states – what Wolff, recalling Locke!s formula-
tion, conceives as the "personal identity! of everyone – are the two essential fea-
tures of the notion of immortality. Wolff!s amendment of the old prejudice con-
sists in conceiving immortality as a so to speak "complex! property of spiritual
substances which requires three essential components: “1. That the soul survives
after the death of the body, and that it doesn!t perish with it; 2. that it persists in a
state of distinct perceptions; 3. that it preserves thememory of itself, that is, that it
remains conscious of its previous life”.36
IV. Immortality and morality
By means of the amendment of the traditional idea of immortality – inspired, as
Thümmig correctly points out, by Leibniz!s statements in the Theodicy37 –,Wolff
integrates the traditional metaphysical proof with a further moral item: the indi-
32 Wolff, Der vernünfftigen Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch
allen Dingen überhaupt, Anderer Theil, bestehend in ausführlichen Anmerckungen, und zu besse-
rem Verstande und bequemerem Gebrauche derselben Herausgegeben (1724), reprint ed. 1740
Hildesheim 1983, § 338 (from now on: Anmerkungen zur deutschen Metaphysik).
33 Wolff, Epistola Gratulatoria, in: Ludwig Philipp Thümmig, Demonstratio immortalitatis ani-
mae ex intima eius natura deducta; oder Gründlicher Beweiß von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele,
Marburg 1737. A German traslation (“Von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele”) can be found in: Wolff,
Gesammlete kleine philosopshische Schrifften, Vierter Teil, Halle 1739, 220–230.
34 According to Thümmig, Plato admits that the soul survives in a condition of distinct percep-
tions, but denies on the grounds of the metempsychosis the preservation of personality (Demon-
stratio [see fn. 33], § VII).
35 Wolff, Psychologia rationalis (see fn. 1), § 741.
36 Ibid., § 739.
37 Thümmig, Demonstratio (see fn. 33), § VII.
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vidualitas physica guaranteed by the incorruptibility of simple substance is now
combinedwith the individualitasmoralis. In thisway, the question of immortality
is conceived in its own complexity as a primarilymoral question, thus also is at the
basis for the teachings of religion about the promise (or threat) of eternal rewards
(or punishments). In fact, as Wolff stresses repeatedly, his notion of immortality
matcheswith the Scripture (“Notio immortalitatis, quamdedimus, scripturae sac-
rae seumenti Christi conformis”38). Recalling the parable of the richman and La-
zarus (Luke 16.19–31) he remarks that
after the richmandied, hewas buried and carried toHades. Since his bodywas buried, it
was his soul the one that went to hell. […] Once in Hades the rich man looked up and
sawAbraham far away, with Lazarus by his side. He recognized them; it means hewas
capable to distinguish them from each other. Thus he had perceptions whose parts were
clear, that is he was in a state of distinct perceptions. He also remembered his brothers
and his previous life. It means that he remembered his past state, [the life] previous to
his death, and recognized he was the same one that was in that previous state. Thus
Christ had the following notion of the immortality of the soul: [1.] the soul doesn!t pe-
rish with the body, but survives after death; 2. the soul keeps notions which are clear in
their parts, and therefore distinct as a whole, i. e. it persists in a state of distinct percep-
tions; 3. after the death of the body the soul remembers itself [scil. : its previous life] .39
Wolff!s notion of immortality confirms, on the one hand, his conviction that ra-
tional psychology supports firmly both religion and morality40 and, on the other
hand, the perfect accordance of his philosophy with the Christian doctrine. In de-
fense of this accordance against the accusations raised by the pietistic theologians,
Wolff stresses in the mentioned Annotations that precisely “on a deeper know-
ledge of the soul rests the certainty of the immortality of the soul, which is an im-
portant fundament of Christian religion, and contributes massively to a proper
practice of virtue”.41
Furthermore,Wolff!s insistence on themoral relevance of the notion of immor-
tality allows him to distinguish clearly between the condition post mortem of hu-
man and animal souls. Even if incorruptible like every simple substance, animal
souls do not preserve any self-consciousness, nor any memory of their past con-
dition. That!s why “brutae personae non sunt”.42 In addiction to that, they are not
properly speaking spirits, i. e. they are not endowed with understanding and free-
will, hence, “although animal souls are incorruptible and do not perish with the
body, however they are not immortal”.43
38 Wolff, Psychologia rationalis (see fn. 1), § 740.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., Praefatio, 5*–6*.
41 Wolff, Anmerkungen zur deutschen Metaphysik (see fn. 32), § 1.
42 Wolff, Psychologia rationalis (see fn. 1), §§ 766 et sq.
43 Ibid., §§ 769, 764.
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Emphasizing the idea that the questionof immortality cannot be considered in a
solelymetaphysical sense,Wolff inaugurates a long series of philosophical reflec-
tions which eventually culminate in the conviction that the proof of immortality
can gain primarily or exclusively a moral certainty. A remarkable step in this
direction was made by a radical opponent of any attempt to provide a rational de-
monstrationof immortality. In 1746GeorgFriedrichMeier publisheshis fortunate
GedankenvomZustandeder Seele nach demTode, where he declares the failure of
any claim of rational psychology concerning immortality. According to Meier,
simplicity is not by itself a guarantee of the survival of the soul after the death
of the body, since, beside being simple, the soul is a finite, contingent being.
Being contingent and not necessary, the soul could cease being, i. e. it may be
or not be. This depends of course on God!s decision, which is impenetrable by
human reason. In the defense of one of his writings on the eternity of the soul,
Meier writes:
The human soul being contingent and finite, it is possible that it dies. God!s omnipot-
ence can annihilate it. Thus the question is if God also decided to do it, or not. Reason
can answer the question in no other way than considering if the whole nexus of the
world necessarily requires the eternal life of the soul, or the opposite. But a finite spirit
cannot conceive the whole nexus of this world; it follows that the immortality of the
soul cannot be demonstrated with mathematical certainty by means of reason.44
According to reason – asMeier claims following the suggestions of his friend and
colleague Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten – we could at most affirm that the soul
is immortal in a hypothetical, but not an absolute sense; that is, the soul can die
even if, according to the teachings of the Scripture, it is very unlikely that it dies.
But conceiving a soulwhich perisheswith her ownbodydoesn!t imply any logical
contradiction, and therefore it cannot be said absolutely immortal. So that forwhat
concerns immortality, we can indeed rely on a different kind of proof, which does
not reach the mathematical certainty of rational deductions, but still provides us
with amoral certainty, i. e. with the highest degree of probability sufficient to our
aims.45 In the Revelation
God announced rewards and punishments that he, because of the highest perfection of
the world, cannot entirely connect with free actions of human beings in this life. It fol-
lows that one can prove the immortality of the soul from God!s revealed justice, but
reason cannot do it. Therefore I showed that mere reason cannot convince us of the im-
44 Georg Friedrich Meier, Vertheidigung des Beweises, daß die menschliche Seele ewig lebe,
Halle 1752, § 2, 8. Cf. Meier, Gedancken von dem Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode, Halle 1746,
§ 22, and § 28: "The death of the soul is possible in itself, and the soul ismortal in itself and for itself!.
45 On moral certainty in the modern tradition up to Kant cf. Luca Fonnesu, Kant on "moral
certainty!, in: Luigi Cataldi Madonna, Paola Rumore (eds.), Kant und die Aufklärung, Hildesheim
2011, 183–204.
Wolff on the immortality of the soul 39
mortality of the soul, although it cannot provide us with any single good reason from
which we could derive with probability the annihilation and the death of the soul.46
Even if a few years later Meier would reconsider his negative judgment on the
rational demonstrations of immortality,47 his early attitude reveals the inadequacy
of the proofs based only on the metaphysical properties of the simple substance.
The long tradition of the so-called "moral proofs! of immortality that goes from
Christian August Crusius to Moses Mendelssohn!s Phaedo will develop on this
path. It includes the topic of immortality in the broader debate about the human
destination, and to Kant!s doctrine of the paralogisms of practical reason.48
V. Conclusion
Wolff!s groundbreaking analysis was immediately perceived as such and promo-
ted byWolff!s supporters. At the very beginning of the 1720 s, Thümmig insisted
in his alreadymentionedDemonstratio on the necessity to include in the notion of
immortality the three features already pinpointed byWolff. “Since the essence of
the soul survives after the death of the body we call it indestructible (indestruct-
ibilis); since it persists in a state of distinct perceptions and preserve the memory
of itself, we call it immortal (immortalis)”.49 Wolff!s proof served not only as re-
futation of the supporters of the death of the soul, but evenmore as a clear criticism
of the belief of the so-called "mortalists!who claimed that the soul, once abando-
ned its earthly life, persists in a state of "sleep! until the sound of the trumpets pro-
claim the Last Judgment at the end of the time. Being the soul rational, it cannot
lose its capacity to have distinct perception; in that case it would lose its proper
essence, and couldn!t therefore be considered the same soul as before.
46 Meier, Gedancken von dem Zustande der Seele nach dem Tode (see fn. 44), § 90, 185. For a
broader investigation of Meier!s idea of immortality cf. Paola Rumore, Georg Friedrich Meiers
Theorie der Unsterblichkeit der Seele im zeitgenössischen Kontext, in: Gideon Stiening, Frank
Grunert (eds.), Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–1777). Philosophie als „wahre Weltweisheit“, Berlin
2015, 163–186.
47 Meier will change his mind thanks to the work on immortality by his friend Samuel Gotthold
Lange, Versuch, des von dem Herrn Georg Friedrich Meier, öffentlichen ordentlichen Lehrer der
Weltweisheit zu Halle, in seinen Gedanken von dem Zustande der Seele nach demTode geleugneten
mathematischen Erweises der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, Halle 1749. Cf. Rumore, Meiers Theorie
der Unsterblichkeit der Seele (see fn. 46).
48 On the topic cf. Paola Rumore, Kant andCrusius on the role of immortality inmorals, in: Corey
W. Dyck, FalkWunderlich (eds.), Kant and his German Contemporaries (in print); CoreyW. Dyck,
Kant and Rational Psychology (see fn. 21); Corey W. Dyck, Beyond the Paralogisms: Kant on the
Immortality of the Soul in the Metaphysics Lecture Notes, in: Robert R. Clewis (ed.), Reading
Kant!s Lectures, Berlin 2015, 115–134; Luca Fonnesu, Kant on "moral certainty! (see fn. 45).
49 Thümmig, Demonstratio (see fn. 33), § VI.
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This aspect of Wolff!s theory of immortality is at the center of one of the most
influential treatise on immortality of the time, that is, the Philosophische Gedan-
ckenüber die vernünfftige Seele und derselben Unsterblichkeit published in 1739
by theLutheran theologian JohannGustavReinbeck, a strong supporter ofWolff!s
cause at the Prussian court.50 As he claimed: “We do not call immortal solelywhat
doesn!t even cease living, ratherwhat has such an essence and nature according to
which it cannot ever cease living”.51 He sums up his demonstration in a series of
statements which deserves to be quoted in full:
I. A simple and indivisible thing is neither body normatter. The rational soul is a simple
and indivisible thing. Therefore, the rational soul is neither body nor matter. II. A sim-
ple and indivisible thing, which has neither body nor matter, is incorruptible and inde-
structible in itself, andmaintains always its reality (Wirklichkeit). The rational soul is a
simple and indestructible thing and has neither body nor matter. Therefore, the rational
soul is incorruptible and indestructible in itself, and maintains continuously its reality.
III. A thingwhich is incorruptible and indestructible in itself, andwhichmaintains con-
tinuously its reality doesn!t ever lose its essence (Wesen). But the rational soul is such a
thing which is incorruptible and indestructible in itself, and maintains continuously its
reality. Therefore, the rational soul doesn!t ever lose its essence. IV. A thing which
doesn!t ever lose its essence and whose essence consists in such a representative power
that allows it to build not only clear but also distinct and general concepts, remains al-
ways able to get concepts of those things which are necessary to rational thought and
judgment. But the rational soul never loses its essence, which consists in such a repres-
entative power that allows it to built not only clear but also distinct and general con-
cepts. Therefore, the rational soul is always able to get concepts of those things
which are necessary to rational thought and judgment.V.A thingwhich remains always
able to get concepts of those things which are necessary to rational thought and judg-
ment is immortal. But the rational soul is such a thing which remains always able to get
concepts of those things which are necessary to rational thought and judgment. The-
refore, the rational soul is immortal.52
The capacity to represent distinctly belongs to the essence of the soul, and is the-
refore preserved even when every connection with the body is over. AsWolff has
shown in his rational psychology, this capacity is grounded on the system of pre-
established harmony which governs the relation between body and soul. Percep-
tions by the soul harmonizewith changes in the bodywithout being influenced by
them – according to Wolff!s enormously debated example, the mouth could pro-
nounce rational speeches even if therewas no rational soul and no rational thought
50 Johann Gustav Reinbeck, Philosophische Gedancken über die vernünfftige Seele und dersel-
ben Unsterblichkeit. Nebst einigen Anmerckungen über ein Frantzösiches Schreiben, darin be-
hauptet werden will, daß dieMaterie dencke, Berlin 1739, reprint Hildesheim 2002. On the topic cf.
Paola Rumore, Materia cogitans. L!Aufklärung di fronte al materialismo, Hildesheim 2013,
218–228; Rumore, Meiers Theorie der Unsterblichkeit der Seele (see fn. 46).
51 Reinbeck, Philosophische Gedancken über die vernünfftige Seele (see fn. 50), § XIX.
52 Ibid., § LXXXVI.
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in that body.53 Therefore – as Reinbeck concludes – there is no contradiction and
nodifficulty in affirming that the rational activity of the soul can be carriedoneven
after the death of the body.54
Wolff!s complex notion of immortality became very soon the standard view on
the question. It can be found in themost influential treatises on immortality of the
time, Johann Friedrich Stiebritz!s Philosophischer Beweis von der Unsterblich-
keit der Seele (1740), and Israel Gottlieb Canz!s Überzeugender Beweißaus der
Vernunft von der Unsterblichkeit sowohl der Menschen Seelen insgemein, als be-
sonders der Kinderseelen (1744) which represents, together with Reinbeck!s
work, the polemical goal of Meier!s refutation of any rational demonstration of
immortality.
But above all, thegroundbreaking character ofWolff!s investigation is revealed
by the effects it produced outside the narrow academic world. In fact, his idea of
immortality became very soon the main weapon of the struggle of German phi-
losophy against the taking over of materialism. Reinbeck!s idea of including in
the publication of his Philosophische Gedanken the German translation of a
famed anonymous writing about thinking matter – most likely a spurious version
ofVoltaire!sLetteron Locke55 – can be understood as a clear attempt to showwhat
kind of dangerous consequences for the foundation of morals and for religious
credo the refusal of Wolff!s proof could imply.56 Wolff!s idea of the soul and
his proof of immortality was what the old guard of German philosophy opposed
to the naturalistic and in some cases even materialistic oriented tendencies of
French philosophy warmly welcomed at the Berlin court after Frederick!s acces-
sion to the throne. In fact, playing precisely on the sovereign personal interest in
53 Wolff, Deutsche Metaphysik (see fn. 1), § 843.
54 Reinbeck, Philosophische Gedancken über die vernünfftige Seele (see fn. 50), § XC.
55 The original title of the so-called Epistula gallica (French letter) was: Copie d!un Manuscript
ou l!on soutient que c!est la mati"re qui pense; cf. Reinbeck, Philosophische Gedancken über die
vernünfftige Seele (see fn. 50), 321–423.
56 Wolff was of the very same idea, as one can read in one of his letters to Manteuffel concerning
Herr Hollmann in Göttingen: “Aus dem angehängten Brieffe des de Voltaire habe ersehen, daß der
Prof. Hollmann in Göttingen seine Sätze, die er in der Theologia naturali behaupten sol, und welche
deswegen noch nicht darf debitiret werden, von demselben entlehnet. Denn er giebet gleichfals vor,
wie mir berichtet wird, daß Gott und die Seele was materielles wären, und man von beyden keinen
Begriff haben könne, folgends nicht wiße, was Gott und die Seele sey, daß Gott weder allwißend,
noch allgegenwärtig seyn könne, und was dergleichen mehr ist. Man könnte nun H. D. Langen
gleichfals vorrücken, daß dieses die Früchte wären, wenn man die Leute von meiner Philosophie
abzöge und ihnen weiß machte, sie könnte ein anders Systema finden, wodurch sie meines ver-
dunckeln und vernichten könnten”. Wolff to Manteuffel, Jan. 20, 1740, in: Katharina Middell,
Hanns-Peter Neumann (eds.), Historisch-kritische Edition des Briefwechsels zwischen Christian
Wolff und Ernst Christoph Graf von Manteuffel, URL = http://nbn-resolving.de/ur-
n:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-106475, Letter Nr. 52.
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the question of immortality the then counselor at the Prussian court, Ernst Chri-
stoph von Manteuffel, a strong supporter of Wolffianism and founder of the So-
cietas Alethophilorum,57 suggested that Frederick read theGermanMetaphysics,
where he would have found “all that a philosopher can say more convincingly in
favor of the immortality of the soul”.58 The long-lasting admiration of the En-
lightened sovereign for Wolffian philosophy, – which was only partially decrea-
sed by Voltaire!s harsh criticisms and which played at the time a so to speak re-
markable "political! role in the cultural scene of Prussia – dates back to this first
propitiousmeetingwithWolff!s clarification of the question of immortality.As he
wrote: “je commence ) apercevoir l!aurore d!un jour qui ne brille pas encore tout )
fait )mes yeux; et je vois qu!il est dans la possibilit% des Þtres que j!aie une (me, et
quemÞme elle soit immortelle. […] Jem!en tiens )Wolff, et pourvu qu!il me pro-
uve bien que mon Þtre indivisible est immortel, je serai content et tranquille.59
Der Aufsatz konzentriert sich aufWolffs Beweis der Unsterblichkeit der Seele, den er so-
wohl in seiner frühen Deutschen Metaphysik als auch in der späteren Psychologia ratio-
nalis vorlegt.Aufgrund derÜberzeugung, dass die Frage derUnsterblichkeit den höchsten
Punkt jeder rationalen Untersuchung der Seele darstellt, zielt der Aufsatz darauf ab, den
bahnbrechenden Charakter von Wolffs Verständnis der Unsterblichkeit hervorzuheben,
der weit über die Grenzen einer bloßen metaphysischen Untersuchung hinausgeht.
Durch die Betonung der moralischen Relevanz der Frage stellt Wolff eine neue Perspek-
tive in die Diskussion über die Unsterblichkeit ein, die auch unter seinen Gegnern massiv
einflussreich sein wird. Im letzten Teil weist der Aufsatz auf die breite Auswirkung von
Wolffs Argument für die Unsterblichkeit und auf seine sozusagen „politische“ Rolle in-
nerhalb der deutschen Kulturszene der Zeit hin.
This paper focuses onWolff!s proof of the immortality of the soul as it is advanced both in
his earlyGermanMetaphysics, and in his laterPsychologia rationalis.Presenting the que-
stion of immortality as the highest point of any rational investigation of the soul, this paper
aims at emphasizing thegroundbreaking character ofWolff!s notion of immortality,which
goes beyond the boundaries of a mere metaphysical investigation. By stressing the moral
relevance of the question,Wolff introduces a newperspective in the debate on immortality,
57 On the Societas Alethophilorum and on the role ofManteuffel in the circulation ofWolffianism
cf. Johannes Bronisch, Der Mäzen der Aufklärung. Ernst Christoph von Manteuffel und das Netz-
werk des Wolffianismus, Berlin 2010.
58 Manteuffel to Brühl, April 24, 1736, quoted in: Hanns-Peter Neumann, Der preußische
Kronprinz Friedrich und die französische Übersetzung der Deutschen Metaphysik Christian Wolffs
im Jahr 1736. Die Identifizierung der Krakauer Handschrift Ms. Gall. Fol. 140 in der Biblioteka
Jagiellonska und der Berliner Handschrift P. 38 in der Bibliothek des Schlosses Charlottenburg, in:
Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preußischen Geschichte N. F. 24 (2014), 35–68, here
fn. 44.
59 Frederick to Suhm, 27. März, 1736, quoted in Hanns-Peter Neumann, Der preußische Kron-
prinz Friedrich und die französische Übersetzung der Deutschen Metaphysik Christian Wolffs im
Jahr 1736 (see fn. 58), fn. 52.
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which will turn to bemassively influential even among his opponents. In the final part, the
paper hints at the broad impact ofWolff!s argument for immortality, and at its so to speak
"political! role within the German cultural scene of the time.
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